Announcing The Hampton Institute!

I'm updating here at OI to announced that I am part of an exciting, new project called The Hampton Institute. Future writing I do will be sent there, so everyone check it out!

http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/

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About the Hampton Institute:

In the late 1920's, while imprisoned under Benito Mussolini's fascist government in Italy, Antonio Gramsci compiled 32 notebooks containing roughly 3,000 pages of work, touching on everything from Italian politics and history to social, economic, and political theory and analysis. During this time, Gramsci coined the term "organic intellectual" to describe conscious members of the working class whom he felt must be developed in contradistinction to the traditional intellectual "clergy," composed of "men of letters, philosophers and professors" who were intimately tied to the dominant culture, and therefore compromised and limited in their own capacity. "All men (and women, we might add) are intellectuals," wrote Gramsci, "but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals." As a Marxist, it was no secret that Gramsci's ideas were centered on the need for revolutionary opposition to the oppressive social relations perpetuated by the capitalist structure - whether represented in the private sphere through property and labor exploitation, or the public sphere through state-backed repression. And while traditional intellectuals certainly played, and continue to play, an important role in this struggle, Gramsci saw the development of the organic intellectual as a crucial component in the ongoing battle for consciousness which exists within the daily lives of the mass of people. "There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded," explained Gramsci. "Everyone carries on some form of intellectual activity, participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought." The organic intellectual possesses the unique ability to touch those who exist within their own social grouping: the working class.

In the late 1920's, while imprisoned under Benito Mussolini's fascist government in Italy, Antonio Gramsci compiled 32 notebooks containing roughly 3,000 pages of work, touching on everything from Italian politics and history to social, economic, and political theory and analysis. During this time, Gramsci coined the term "organic intellectual" to describe conscious members of the working class whom he felt must be developed in contradistinction to the traditional intellectual "clergy," composed of "men of letters, philosophers and professors" who were intimately tied to the dominant culture, and therefore compromised and limited in their own capacity. "All men (and women, we might add) are intellectuals," wrote Gramsci, "but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals." As a Marxist, it was no secret that Gramsci's ideas were centered on the need for revolutionary opposition to the oppressive social relations perpetuated by the capitalist structure - whether represented in the private sphere through property and labor exploitation, or the public sphere through state-backed repression. And while traditional intellectuals certainly played, and continue to play, an important role in this struggle, Gramsci saw the development of the organic intellectual as a crucial component in the ongoing battle for consciousness which exists within the daily lives of the mass of people. "There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded," explained Gramsci. "Everyone carries on some form of intellectual activity, participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought." The organic intellectual possesses the unique ability to touch those who exist within their own social grouping: the working class.

As a youth organizer for the NAACP and eventual leader of the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Fred Hampton was the embodiment of Gramsci's "organic intellectual." Born to working class parents, Hampton became a pre-law major in college and deployed his knowledge to combat police brutality and unfair law enforcement practices that targeted impoverished black youth in the greater Chicago area. Hampton's realization of the inherent connection between institutional racism and class politics led him to negotiate a "class-conscious, multi-racial alliance" between politicized organizations (the BPP and Students for a Democratic Society) and Chicago's major street gangs (Young Patriots, Young Lords, Blackstone Rangers, Brown Berets and Red Guard Party). As BPP's local leader, Hampton organized rallies, assisted with maintaining a local medical clinic, taught weekly political education classes, and operated a Free Breakfast Program for underprivileged children. As both an organic intellectual and de facto educator, Hampton's brilliant oratory skills were not used to place himself above the oppressed, but rather to immerse himself within the oppressed community of which he was a member. His words, and the linguistic style in which his analysis was advanced, were a shining example of the simultaneous process of education and dialogue that must take place with the oppressed. Ultimately, Hampton was the praxis to Gramsci's theory. By combining an effective class analysis with a stage-based social application that included "real world" solutions, he was the quintessential revolutionary. "That's what the Breakfast for Children Program is," explained Hampton. "A lot of people think it's simply charity, but what does it do? It takes people from a stage to a stage to another stage. Any program that's revolutionary is an advancing program. Revolution is change." In addition to praxis, he and the BPP fortified and transcended the struggle against racial oppression by effectively tying it to the international class struggle, much like Dr. King was doing with a critical assessment of war and poverty. "We're not gonna fight fire with fire, we're gonna fight fire with water," cried Hampton. "We're not gonna fight racism with racism, we're gonna fight racism with (working class) solidarity!" His untimely and tragic murder at the hands of Chicago police would ultimately stifle the revolutionary momentum of the time. However, as Hampton once proclaimed, "You can kill the revolutionary, but you can never kill the revolution!"As a youth organizer for the NAACP and eventual leader of the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Fred Hampton was the embodiment of Gramsci's "organic intellectual." Born to working class parents, Hampton became a pre-law major in college and deployed his knowledge to combat police brutality and unfair law enforcement practices that targeted impoverished black youth in the greater Chicago area. Hampton's realization of the inherent connection between institutional racism and class politics led him to negotiate a "class-conscious, multi-racial alliance" between politicized organizations (the BPP and Students for a Democratic Society) and Chicago's major street gangs (Young Patriots, Young Lords, Blackstone Rangers, Brown Berets and Red Guard Party). As BPP's local leader, Hampton organized rallies, assisted with maintaining a local medical clinic, taught weekly political education classes, and operated a Free Breakfast Program for underprivileged children. As both an organic intellectual and de facto educator, Hampton's brilliant oratory skills were not used to place himself above the oppressed, but rather to immerse himself within the oppressed community of which he was a member. His words, and the linguistic style in which his analysis was advanced, were a shining example of the simultaneous process of education and dialogue that must take place with the oppressed. Ultimately, Hampton was the praxis to Gramsci's theory. By combining an effective class analysis with a stage-based social application that included "real world" solutions, he was the quintessential revolutionary. "That's what the Breakfast for Children Program is," explained Hampton. "A lot of people think it's simply charity, but what does it do? It takes people from a stage to a stage to another stage. Any program that's revolutionary is an advancing program. Revolution is change." In addition to praxis, he and the BPP fortified and transcended the struggle against racial oppression by effectively tying it to the international class struggle, much like Dr. King was doing with a critical assessment of war and poverty. "We're not gonna fight fire with fire, we're gonna fight fire with water," cried Hampton. "We're not gonna fight racism with racism, we're gonna fight racism with (working class) solidarity!" His untimely and tragic murder at the hands of Chicago police would ultimately stifle the revolutionary momentum of the time. However, as Hampton once proclaimed, "You can kill the revolutionary, but you can never kill the revolution!"

Uncommon Sense or Traditional Ethnocentrism?

Uncommon Sense or Traditional Ethnocentrism? 
A Review of Uncommon Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science by Alan Cromer

Given the ideological dominance of scientific thought and the scientific community in the 21st century, science is often portrayed as a natural development or growth arising from innate human proclivities towards such methodological inquiry. Alan Cromer, in his book Uncommon Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science, forcefully rejects the notion constructed by some scientists and historians that science was a predetermined or mechanistic development in the course of human evolution. In contrast with the commonly accepted view that the development of science is a natural process, he attempts to trace the metaphysical origin and historical trajectory of scientific inquiry as a unique phenomenon occurring because of the peculiar material and cultural developments observed in Ancient Greece. In other words, Cromer posits that science developed not because humans have a natural proclivity towards it, but because the society established in Ancient Greece, and nowhere else, cultivated the perfect combination of economic and ideological variables that lead to its development. He argues that no other place in the world developed, nor could have developed, modern science, as the concept is understood today. By rooting the development of scientific inquiry in its material and economic roots, and simultaneously drawing on a myriad of sources and documents, Cromer makes a compelling but ultimately flawed argument for his case.

Although not substantively dealt with until much later in the book, it is important to note at this point that Cromer accepts the definition of science articulated by the British physicist John Ziman. Ziman argues that science is a social activity and can be defined as “the search for a consensus of rational opinion among all competent researchers.”[1] All of chapter one deals with particular aspects of science and Cromer maintains that science, despite a few exceptional leaps in scientific theory, is generally cumulative rather than revolutionary in its advancement. Due to this fact, the scientific basis upon which the scientific community currently builds is relatively stable. Cromer skillfully utilizes the theory of Newtonian mechanics to reinforce this assertion:

Although some future theory may be able to relate G, m, e, c, and h to a smaller set of still more fundamental constants, it won’t decrease the validity or scope of the existing relations that involve them. Our knowledge of Newtonian mechanics and quantum theory is complete because it is knowledge — not of absolute causes, but of relations of broad generality — that is valid to the limits of our current measuring abilities. Future theories can only broaden the scope and deepen the range of our knowledge.[2]

 He cites the exploration of DNA as yet another example of this principle. Thus, the fact that science is so recent and complete in its fundamental knowledge, and intrinsically unified, allows Cromer to posit that “for the first time in human history we have true knowledge of the nature of existence and of our place in it.”[3] Establishing truth and certainty as the basis upon which modern science is predicated, however, is only an ancillary argument in his book. According to Cromer, “higher rational abilities don’t develop spontaneously, but must be carefully cultivated by a process of formal education.”[4] Therefore, something other than the course of human evolution must have galvanized the development of such an unnatural intellectual propensity.

Cromer’s primary thesis rests in his contention that Ancient Greece was the womb in which the modem conception of science was cultivated. He begins by constructing a dichotomy between scholars who argue the traditional view that science was “a product of the special genius of Ancient Greece... [which] developed the concepts of objectivity and deductive reasoning that are necessary for science” and those who argue that science develops in all civilizations but some may develop the concept further than others.[5] Cromer develops what he labels a neotraditionalist interpretation of scientific development. Within this framework he claims that “antecedents of science either permeate a culture or are absent altogether.”[6] Thus, the tradition of open debate and non-contradiction, found solely in Ancient Greece, support the idea that science is not a natural proclivity but a historically unique phenomenon that can only be developed “under a very precise set of cultural circumstances.”[7] This is the fundamental thesis that runs throughout Cromer’s work.

Alongside this is the rejection that science ought to be applied to any system of thought dealing with problem-solving. Therefore, according to Cromer any “bland relativism that applies the term science so indiscriminately…hopelessly muddles thinking on the subject.”[8] Nonscientific systems such as psychoanalysis and astrology function within their own traditions and their own closed sets of ideas. They, accordingly, do not constitute authentic science. Cromer spends an entire chapter comparing and contrasting different forms of what he considers to be pseudoscience. Similarly, he purports that the technological advances in a variety of areas across a broad range of different civilizations, including China, Egypt, and the Islamic world, do not constitute a holistic and rational scientific approach comparable to modern forms of scientific endeavors.

Cromer maintains, in alignment with the psychologist Piaget, that the development of rational capabilities require cumulative accumulation. Therefore, rational and critical capacities must be overtly cultivated and fostered. They require a specific environment which, he argues, only the Greeks were able to develop. The result is that other societies, even if they produced certain technological advances beyond the Greeks, could not break through traditional egocentrism into scientific objectivity. However, Cromer attempts to formulate a dialectical synthesis between objectivity and subjectivity; “Although it sounds contradictory,” he explains, “what we call objective thinking is possible only after we come to understand the subjective nature of thought”[9] Once that subjective nature is understood, a break with egocentric continuity between private thoughts and the external world is possible. Only then, with the emergence of this historic schism, and the recognition of the role subjectivity plays, is the development of rational, scientific models able to come to the fore.

Cromer briefly outlines the evolution of humanity in order to situate the development of rational thinking in its historical and evolutionary context. After articulating how early humanoids interacted and positing a variety of plausible explanations for common behaviors among them, he moves on to juxtaposing Ancient Greece and Israel. By reviewing the dominant literature of these two civilizations, the Iliad, Odyssey, and the Old Testament, Cromer argues how these works are manifestations of the dominant ideological discourse and nature of thought present in these societies. In the former, open debate and the ideas of non-contradiction are fundamental aspects in Greek society and are ever present in the stories written by Homer. In the former, appeals to mysticism and higher powers prevail as the dominant discourse. Cromer credits the Greeks with developing a variety of mathematical branches, science, astronomy, theater, history, history, philosophy, and democracy, all of which resulted from their contribution of objectivity and the development of their rational capacities. The development of such rationality in Greek society is attributed to a variety of cultural factors, with material conditions playing an ancillary role in this development The Greco-Israeli paradigm is the primary example supporting his thesis.

The rise of Christianity into power alongside repeated attacks by what Cromer refers to as barbarian hordes during the fifth and sixth century decelerated the spread and eventually reduced notions of rationality and objectivity to an obscure and esoteric fate. It was not until the resurgence of European developments associated with Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, which Cromer maintains was “directly simulated by the work of ancient Greek mathematicians, astronomers, and natural philosophers,”[10] that science again became universal discourse. His argument is that during the European dark ages, even great civilizations such as China, India, and the Islamic world did not develop scientific inquiry. China, despite being “more unified, organized, cultivated, and technologically advanced than Europe” for many centuries, never reached objective thinking.[11] Instead, Cromer argues that such a rigid and hierarchical bureaucracy, along with affiliative or purely collective forms of thinking, actually dissuaded the pursuit and development of science. India, despite some mathematical developments, remained trapped in an egocentric ideology that often dismissed the material world. Islamic society actually produced technological advances and maintained Greek classics, which spurred the scientific revolution in Europe. However, Cromer argues that religious restrictions on things like printing and surgery kept Islam “cut off from the scientific revolution that...it helped initiate.”[12] Therefore, rationality and scientific pursuit is a decidedly Greek phenomenon.

Material changes in European society galvanized the growth of capitalism and an economic system. These included, but were not limited to, the expansion of trade and the development of technological advances such as three-crop rotation systems and the horse collar which, subsequently, augmented crop production and work output,. Therefore, a combination of material changes led to the scientific revolution in Europe, and Europe alone:

First, European science was a direct continuation of Greek science... Second, the distinctive feature of European culture was its tendency to develop autonomous self-governing institutions [the guild and university, which]… offered stability and continuity to Europe’s intellectual life... Third, capitalism provided a force and a class that could stand up to the nobility and the clergy... Fourth, the printing of inexpensive books spread new ideas among the learned and also made possible the education of an increasing number of students from the middle class.

 Thus, Cromer’s assertion is buttressed by his reference to the changing material conditions which were made possible primarily by chance. The ideological and cultural impacts that these material conditions, along with the lasting legacy of Ancient Greece, had on Europe were the primary reason why science was resurrected there and not methodologically constructed elsewhere.

In essence, then, his thesis is that science is a unique phenomenon that is not common to humanity and, due to this, it developed because of the particular material and cultural dimensions of one society. The potential for science, the rational pursuit of consensus concerning objective knowledge, can only develop given certain historical conditions. Cromer argues that despite the existence of these conditions, however, the development of rationality and science is not mechanistically determined or inevitable. Instead, a unique synthesis of objective and subjective elements, the material conditions and subsequent cultural predilections crafted by human thought and action, must occur. This synthesis is what fosters the development of scientific inquiry.

There are many strengths and factors that contribute heavily to the legitimacy Cromer’s work and reinforce his thesis. The approach he utilizes as his analytical framework is a materialist one. First, Cromer attempts to draw on a wide range of sources to support his thesis. Throughout the work he cites a wide range of literature from the Bible to Homer’s epics, classic philosophers like Aristotle, major scientific theorists such as Newton and Einstein, and scientific researchers studying a broad array of topics. This extensive arsenal of primary and secondary source material gives a sense of legitimacy and scope that scaffolds his argument. Second, the sociological approach he uses to address a history of science, and the definition of science itself; is a unique approach that allows room for debate. Scientific advances and the development of rational, scientific inquiry are situated within their appropriate historical, social, economic, and political contexts. Furthermore, Cromer’s relatively easy approach allows for non-science majors to comprehend the often dense, theoretical, and esoteric topics he engages.

Perhaps both the strongest and weakest aspect of his is that it is, essentially, a materialist one. Although no explicit materialist label is provided by Cromer, it is clear that he addresses the material conditions as the root out of which society, culture, and evolution occurs. Vague abstractions and idealistic notions are rejected for a solid, fundamentally material analysis. His approach, as seen near the end of his chapter titled “From Apes to Agriculture,” even incorporates a nascent understanding of class struggle in the development of human society. This class struggle, however, is ancillary in Cromer’s view. The term is not used, but the concept is present. Cromer generally portrays an accurate view of human history and evolution. He makes it clear that material conditions, and not abstract ideological changes or idealistic tribal leaders, forced the development of agriculture. “The Neolithic agricultural revolution was one of the most important episodes in human history,” he explains, “It’s wrong, however, to think that it was an advance on a previous economy. Agriculture arose from grim necessity.”[13] This materialism, however, could be attributed purely to a Darwinian approach. It is clear when analyzing Ancient Greece that Cromer falls far short of a Marxist or dialectical approach.

Therefore, his primary weakness arises from the fact that his materialism falls far short of a serious, consistent historical analysis. Although rooting any work in a materialist framework is important, Cromer falls into the trap of reductionism. It is clear that an analysis based upon dialectical materialism could have broadened Cromer’s scope and allowed for a more lucid, holistic work. Instead, as evident in his analysis of Ancient Greece, Cromer’s materialism is often haphazardly applied. For instance, he locates the development of Greek rationality in seven essential Greek characteristics: the assembly, a maritime economy, the existence of a widespread Greek-speaking world, the existence of an independent merchant class who could educate themselves the Iliad and the Odyssey, and a literary religion not dominated by priests, and finally, the “persistence of these factors for 1,000 years.”[14] Out of these, only two deal with material and economic conditions; namely, the development of a maritime economy and a merchant class. However, the other factors, while vital it his analysis of why Greek society developed rationality, are ideological abstractions that Cromer does not provide a material base for. In other words, he appears to adopt a rather Hegelian approach that puts the idea before the world that constructed it. For example, when dealing with the assembly he shows how rationality and non-contradiction were fundamental aspects. Yet, the actual development of the assembly, and how Greek society was the sole society to develop such a democratic institution, is not addressed. In other words, Cromer leaves this purely to chance and gives no real material root for why and how such an institution developed. It is in instances like these that his analysis appears superficial. Even with these critical oversights, his primary argument is clearly flawed.

Subsequently, his material framework is all too often used solely as a historic approach; Cromer’s analysis of contemporary society post-Scientific Revolution, and his specific proposal for educational reform, lacks the critical insight and piercing clarity that his historical analysis can potentially offer. His political convictions often shine through in his work, diminishing the clarity and objectivity he claims to support. For instance, he claims that the redirection “from physical aggression to economic aggression” is one of the “major accomplishments of our species.”[15] This is the same economic aggression, manifested in a capitalist economic system, which condemns millions of people to death every year because they are not part of the market system or force millions to toil under heavily exploitative conditions for the benefit of an elite economic class of owners. Despite this, the assertion itself is not accurate. Humanity has not been redirected from physical aggression. The last century, which has been plagued by world wars and imperialistic slaughters, dismisses such an utterly absurd statement. His hagiographic analysis of capitalism is evident elsewhere throughout the book as well. Furthermore, his assertion that it was the “entrepreneurial spirit” that “launched the age of discovery”[16] in medieval Europe is drastically misguided. Instead, an analysis of the colonial drive for primitive accumulation by the burgeoning capitalist class and the militaristic monarchial regimes striving to maintain dominance would have been much more appropriate. This sort of Euro-centrism often pierces and deflates an otherwise important material analysis.

Considering these theoretical failures, Cromer also commits a myriad of fallacies and purports truth to a list of historical inaccuracies. For instance, when he proclaims that if Greek mathematics “had been totally lost, it probably would never have been reinvented” is an utterly absurd statement to make. Despite authoritatively asserting such nonsense, Cromer gives no serious evidence to support such an absolute statement. While it is clear that the material base determines what ideological superstructures can potentially arise in any given society, it is not so clear that objectivity and rationality were the result of a highly unique Greek culture. Similarly, the idea that Ancient Greece discovered objective thinking and that Homer was the world’s first example of it are not only improbable, they are impossible to prove.

Similarly, when Cromer adopts his definition of science as the search for consensus of rational opinion among all competent researchers, he cloaks what he refers to as this sociological definition in a host of glittering generalities. For instance, he never defines what constitutes a rational opinion or competent researcher. He asserts throughout the book that some objective, eternal reality must exist which can constitute an objective search for rationality. However, he does not address the problem that arises when one considers that different opinions or ideas could prove rational within a particular framework. For instance, inside a capitalist mode of production where inter-state rivalries pursue nuclear weapons to maintain hegemony in a region or over the globe, such massive weapons of human destruction, and their creation by purportedly rational scientists, may appear rational to some observers. In some other context, a society where Cromer’s supposedly benevolent economic competition is a thing of the past, nuclear weapons may prove a futile, irrational waste.

Historically, Cromer’s arguments often fail the test as well. He constructs a dichotomy where two forms of intelligence dominate. One, the kind human beings have been confined to for most of their existence, is common intelligence that confuses consciousness with egocentrism and, therefore, is nothing more than the intelligence an animal would possess. The other, the unique kind Cromer posits only developed in Greek society, is the hyper-rationalism suited to mathematical methodology and consciously cultivated. Although the argument for unique cultural factors contributing to the development of such intelligence may appear legitimate, this dichotomy is arbitrarily constructed and defended with religious zeal. There are a multitude of problems with this approach.

First, it is entirely too simplistic to assert that there is a black and white choice between excepting the traditional view of science originating in Greece and science developing in every human civilization. The reality is much more complex. For instance, many scientists and historians posit that the development of monotheism was an essential step towards the scientific concept of the universe being constructed along certain natural laws. This could disqualify Cromer’s assertion that science could not “evolve from the prophetic tradition of Judaism and Christianity.”[17] Similarly, many of the earliest European scientists came directly from the church apparatus. Although it is fair to say that at times the church greatly hindered scientific development, the claim cannot be made that Christianity single-handedly destroyed the scientific rationality developed in Greece.

Furthermore, the ethnocentrism Cromer displays is historically inaccurate as well. While it is not true that scientific though is innately generated by every human being confronted with a problem, this does not mean that Cromer’s equally dramatic assertion is the only explanation left. Cromer maintains that the Scientific Revolution was a direct continuation of the work done by ancient Greek figures. This is blatantly false. The Scientific Revolution in Europe would never have been realized without the stimulus provided by the Islamic societies that kept Greek learning and rational thought alive. The very fact that scholars within Islamic society maintained such a rigorous and methodological method of learning is not diminished simply because some sectors of society were dominated by religion. Even during the European rebirth in scientific thought this was the case.

Lastly, despite Cromer’s claims otherwise, the significant scientific and mathematical advances developed in Islamic societies, India, and the Mesopotamian area cannot be ignored. Things like the concept of zero and infinity were fundamental for mathematics. Without some form of rational and critical inquiry these developments would not have been possible. It is a strong claim to make, and one nearly impossible to prove, that throughout the history of such civilizations no form of rational thought was developed that lead to scientific inquiry.

Perhaps the most distressing view he takes is on education, where he asserts vacuously that the problem with American education is “fundamentally one of values.”[18] Instead of addressing institutional inequality, an entirely unequal funding structure for schools, a prodigious lack of resources, racism, economic segregation, and a host of other ills that the American educational system faces, Cromer simply asserts that “the poorest and least successful families dictate what public schools can demand of students and parents.”[19] His class consciousness is apparently not in solidarity with the working majority. In place of the current system, he advocates what is essentially a meritocracy based upon the principle of social efficiency. Churning out obedient workers and transforming them into what is the most economically advantageous for the state apparatus remains his primary goal, despite the rhetoric he sometimes employs about higher levels of thinking. Even more extreme social and economic stratification, then, based upon a purportedly meritocratic system, would be the result of Cromer’s educational reforms. This chapter was the most disappointing conclusion to an otherwise thought-provoking and engaging work.

Cromer provides a lucid and entertaining read that is accessible to non-science majors and lays out a host of important arguments and ideas to consider. He utilizes a wide range of sources and theories, properly engaged as to not confuse the reader, to support the main tenants of his argument. He falls short in some areas, especially concerning his approach to education and his extreme emphasis on the merits of the capitalist economic system. However, his thesis that science and rationality ought to be cultivated, and are not necessarily inherent to human thought, is a fair proposition. It is not so clear, however, that Greece was the only society to ever develop rational thinking and scientific inquiry. Still, Uncommon Sense ought to be read by anyone who finds science or history engaging but none of Cromer’ s propositions ought to be accepted without a serious and critical analysis.

---

[1] Cromer, A., Uncommon Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1993), 144.

[2] Cromer, Uncommon Sense, 13.

[3] Ibid., 17.

[4] Ibid., 18.

[5] Ibid., vii.

[6] Ibid., viii.

[7] Ibid., x.

[8] Ibid., 19.

[9]Ibid.,  29.

[10] Ibid., 100.

[11] Ibid., 103.

[12] Ibid., 100.

[13] Ibid., 140-1.

[14] Ibid., 60.

[15] Ibid., 79.

[16] Ibid., 56.

[17] Ibid., 70.

[18] Ibid., 198.

[19] Ibid., 199.

The Reality of Jacobin Terror and the Subsequent Rise and Fall of the Directory

Often “The Terror” is treated by historians as the product of the deranged Jacobins, who, aspiring to dictatorial achievement hoped to purge themselves of all political enemies. Rather than appropriately considered within the context of France in the summer of 1973, the events of the Terror are abstracted from the existing material conditions. The Terror, however, is much better understood when analyzed within the matrix of the devastating famine hitting Paris that year, bread hoarders hoping to increase profits on the black market (Steel 199), massive coalition of hostile enemies along France’s borders, and counter-revolutionary royalists plotting to reinstitute the monarchy at home. The subsequent rise and fall of the more reactionary Directory are inextricably linked to the Terror and, indeed, grew out of it.

The Terror, more than anything, while manifesting itself in a rather disorganized and decentralized manner, was a general reflection of the atmosphere of Paris in 1973. In a relatively short amount of time, the government passed the “Law of Suspects” which essentially removed civil liberties in France while the new “Revolutionary Tribunal” was established and granted powers to allow rapid application of the guillotine (which, it must be mentioned, was a rather new and humane form of death in comparison to the old methods). It was intended, rather explicitly, to deal with all counter-revolutionary activity in hopes of suppressing Royalist plots to restore the monarchy. It quickly became utilized to target particular political personalities as well who were more or less radical than the Jacobin dominated government approved of.

This Terror, however, occurred within the context of France’s most tumultuous moments. Bread rations were extremely low and hoarders exacerbated the problem by hoarding grain in hopes of turning over a larger profit by keeping it off the market. On all sides France was surrounded by foreign armies: a British fleet was just off the coast of Marseilles, coalition forces were present along the Pyrenees and had already set foot in Flanders, and counter-revolutionary priests and nobles plotted rebellions in various provinces (Doyle 256). As the government had witnessed in September of 1792, the Parisian masses were not content with allowing Royalist plotters to go unpunished. For instance, when Montmarin, who had been plotting to help reestablish the monarchy, was caught and put on trial, the reactionary judge allowed to go free; such a reactionary court rulings stirred up tremendous anger amongst the common people who wished to preserve the society they fought so hard to rebuild. As E. Belfort Bax explains, “Moderatist and Girondist Assembly hesitated at making a few examples of even the most notorious of these plotters” and thus, Parisians took it upon themselves to administer ad hoc justice to those accused nobles and Royalists sitting in prison. When Danton began organizing soldiers to go to the front to meet the foreign armies, many exclaimed they would not go fight foreign enemies while living enemies right in Paris; thus, to effectively organize resistance to the European coalition, the Jacobin government had to reassure the people of France that they were not leaving plotters safe to rise up against a defenseless homeland when the men had gone off to fight (Bax).

Therefore, the Terror was intended not only to do away with counter-revolutionaries and grain-hoarders at home, it was also facilitated the ability to raise soldiers to fight off foreign invasion. Thousands were killed, and many were targeted not for counter-revolution or for hoarding, but for political reasons under rather tenuous claims propped up by the Law of Suspects. And although this fact alone provides no defense, it should be noted that the Terror claimed relatively few victims in comparison to other contemporary massacres enforced by more conservative heads of state in other nations (Doyle 259). The Jacobins, more concerned perhaps with this than with other domestic affairs, ultimately failed to address the social concerns much needed in 1973-4. While Doyle maintains that “by the spring of 1974 France was obviously making substantial progress towards a controlled economy,” (Doyle 265), they had not, and would not, implement the constitution of 1793 restoring civil liberties and rights to French citizens. Instead, the Terror would continue even after successful military victories and the elimination, in large part, of counter-revolutionaries at home. While the Jacobins helped assure bread rations to the people with the laws of maximum, they also eventually implemented the same laws against rises in wages, alienating themselves from the burgeoning proletariat. Similarly, they attacked political targets both to the right and the left, creating for themselves enemies on multiple fronts and, in short, laying the foundations for their own downfall.

Thus, the Jacobins isolated themselves from their social base, the sans-culottes, through reactionary economic policies and political terror. They also instituted a leveé en masse, essentially a draft, which further increased hostility among the peasant masses forced to leave their homes to fight. Moderates, not missing a step, quickly latched on to their chance to impose reactionary measures against the radical Jacobins; under the promulgation of “stability,” they drafted a new constitution which reflected the class interests of the prosperous bourgeoisie. It, like the constitution of 1791, rested on an relatively nominal social, but prodigious economic, basis and effectively meant that the government would function to perpetuate the rule of the new wealthy class. As Doyle notes, “Until the fall of Robespierre the poor had made considerable progress in the struggle” (Doyle 324), this was shattered by the reactionary economic policies begun by the Jacobins but instituted even more profoundly by the moderates. Coupled with the State’s bankruptcy and increased power, through new laws, to heavily tax the citizens, the Directory even managed to augment unpopularity among propertied groups it represented (Doyle 334).

However, after attempting to circumvent democratic institutions with laws such as the two-thirds law which would dictate that at least two-thirds of the writers of the new constitution to take seats in the legislature (Doyle 320) and ensuring that only a relatively small electorate could participate, the Directory still found themselves still showing poorly in elections. Their response was to simply trample over the electoral process, alienating themselves further from the democratic and republican sympathies of the majority. “Blatant steps were therefore taken to rig the outcome at every stage” as radical Jacobin influence shone through the electoral process (Doyle 336). They utilized the military to play a balancing act between conservative royalist forces and radical Jacobins, acting rather whimsically in their vacillation of repression towards one or the other and isolating both. Likewise, their lax economic policies and commitment to laissez-faire capitalism inspired serious disillusionment with the new government among the masses. The Directory effectively isolated themselves from the vast majority of the people while, at the same time, not garnering a large enough social base upon which they could fend off attack; thus, the doors were opened for Napoleon to enter the scene and skillfully manipulate the political situation.

Works Cited

Bax, E. Belfort, Jean-Paul Marat: The People’s Friend. (1900) Available from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/bax/1900/marat/index.htm; Internet.
Doyle, William. The Oxford History of the French Revolution. (Oxford University Press, 2002).
Steel, Mark. Vive La Revolucion: A Stand-Up History of the French Revolution. (Haymarket Books, 2003).

On the Question of Revolution Part II

The role of violence in revolution, however, has never been and cannot be formulated into a universal principle. A revolution can come in the form of a popularly supported military take over by a small vanguard (as in Cuba), through an enormous and bloody civil war (the U.S. Civil War) or through consistent struggle using strike tactics and workplace takeovers (halting production, the economy, etc.), culminating in a general strike with relatively little bloodshed (the Russian Revolution). However, the form of the revolution is largely determinant of what kind of society can or will be produced from the old society’s ashes. Likewise, the amount of the violence which occurs is largely dependent upon diverse variables, namely: the material conditions, the political atmosphere, the development in the consciousness of the participants, the numbers involved, etc. Generally, revolutionaries take a principled stand against violence, especially in the forms which manifest themselves through state power (war, police brutality, etc.), racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia, and other types of prejudice. Similarly, any sort of progressive revolutionary would not call for egregious or unnecessary violence. It would, however, be nearly impossible to find a revolution which was entirely bloodless; radical black civil rights leader Malcolm X succinctly outlines this point: “The French Revolution, what was it based on — the landless against the landlord. What was it for? Land! How did they get it? Bloodshed! There was no love lost, was no compromise, was no negotiation…You don’t have a revolution that doesn’t involve bloodshed.” Thus, to fully understand why and how violence becomes such an issue, the sources and initiators of the violence must be thoroughly analyzed.

For instance, assume that a revolution based on the socialist principles of the workers owning the means of production (factories, schools, offices, etc.) were to occur in the United States. If the workers managed to expropriate the work place, remove the top-down, tyrannical rule of the CEO and install democratic, grassroots institutions, one would have to be willfully ignorant of the lessons of history and class struggle to assume that the ruling class and the state would not forcefully impose itself upon the workers to regain control. One would be hard pressed to find an instance in history where power or privilege was given to the workers and citizens of society without a fight. The great abolitionist Frederick Douglas, in his most famous line, explains that “[p]ower concedes nothing without demand. It never has and never will.”

Thus, it is only sensible that when met with force the working class would have to respond, in defense of the gains made, with force. At the same time, any sensible working class movement would likely attempt to win over portions of the military and police forces (who, of course, largely consist of the working class, a useful contradiction under capitalism) the same way Russian revolutionaries won over soldiers and the Cossacks. It follows that the larger the portion won over to revolution, the less violence is needed to combat the state apparatus.

Some pacifists may contend that all violence should be avoided and is inexcusable. The same pacifist, then, would not accept the violence directed against the state as legitimate and thus, give tacit support to the state’s monopoly on force. The question of the violence of the slave master and the violence of the slave comes into play here; for a pacifist to condemn the violence of a slave breaking the chains of his bondage (which may include violence against the master) is to realistically support the institution of slavery, whether or not one chooses to morally accept it. In a revolutionary situation, it is almost certain that the need for violence will arise at some point to defend the achievements which have been won. Likewise, as history has proven repeatedly, it is extremely foolish for revolutionaries to allow the counterrevolutionary forces the time and resources needed to crush a nascent revolution.

The example of the Paris Commune of 1871 is didactic in this regard. After workers rose up and took control of the city during the Franco-Prussian War, they collectively organized into what some call the first “workers’ state.” The installation of participatory democracy, the separation of church and state, the right of women to vote, the abolition of rent and interest on loans, the postponement of debt, self-policing neighborhoods, and the right of workers to take over a business were some of the major gains made under the Commune. The ruling elites had escaped to Versailles during the war and, not intending the people of Paris to rise up and throw off the shackles of the old society, quickly began to prepare to take Paris back. Prussia, France’s mortal enemy only months previously, quickly released French prisoners of war to help take back the city; the ruling classes of every nation-state were quite terrified by this rapid development of working class power.

As Karl Marx points out, the communards made crucial mistakes by not attacking Versailles and crushing the counterrevolutionary forces which were amassing and, likewise, by failing to seize hold of the national bank immediately. These mistakes eventually caused the Paris Commune to fail as the army marched from Versailles (funded with the money retrieved from the national bank in Paris) and laid siege to the city; ultimately tens of thousands of revolutionary Parisians were killed and the Commune was crushed. Marx would later argue that the fatal mistake was attempting to simply adhere to the old state institutions (such as trying to borrow money from the national bank) rather than destroying the remnants of the previous society (the military, the old leaders, etc.). CLR James, tracing Marx’s argument, explains that “the capitalist army, the capitalist state, the capitalist bureaucracy, cannot be seized by the revolutionary proletariat and used for its own purposes. It had to be smashed completely and a new state organized, based upon the organization of the working class.” This example highlights the fact that the overwhelming use of violence comes from those who wish to stop the transformation of society. The counter-revolutionary forces, the ruling class and those working for it, will assuredly use any means within their grasp to maintain power; thus, it is apparent that revolutionaries cannot simply allow them to do so and, if necessary, must use force to stop them.

The last and possibly most important question concerning American Radicalism is “Can revolution happen in the United States?” The real question, however, should be asked in a slightly different manner: “Can revolution happen again in the United States?” It must not be forgotten that the American War of Independence was a revolutionary upheaval against a monarch which cast off the chains of colonialism. The Civil War tore the country apart and ultimately ended in the abolition of slavery, upon which the entire Southern economy was built. This question, so often pondered by those seeking radical change, is usually answered in the negative. Purported causes run the gamut but some of the common assertions for the inauspiciousness of revolution are as follows: the working class is bought off, the general apathy of the population makes it impossible, the seemingly impregnable military power of the United States government is to great an obstacle, and finally, the internal class structure has changed so dramatically that revolution in the dialectical materialist (socialist, Marxist, etc.) sense is infeasible.

The first three claims can be easily dismissed. “Political” and “economic” issues affect people every day and, whether or not they know it, they are engaged in them. Agree or disagree, their tax dollars fund imperialist wars. The conditions of their roads, schools, infrastructure, and social services are dependant upon political policy. Their employment (or lack thereof), wages, and benefits are inevitably tied up in the capitalist system. Since the late 1970’s until today, real wages for workers have decreased, median family incomes have only been maintained by dramatically increasing work hours and productivity, and some forty seven million Americans are without health insurance. Meanwhile, the wealthiest one percent of the population’s income has tripled, largely negating the idea that the working class has been “bought off” common in New Left radicalism of the 1970’s and even carrying over into today.

The very fact that the military is largely drawn from the working class and the poor is also essential to understanding the role that radicals should play in recruiting soldiers and military personal. One of the most percussive blows to U.S. imperialism was the resistance of G.I.s, many of them radicalized during the process, against the Vietnam war embodied in the mobilization of their collective power into the group Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) ; today, Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW) are spearheading the anti-war movement alongside radicals, socialists, and other progressives. Winning over soldiers and sections of the military is key to organizing against not only imperialism, but the current economic system. Thus, the material conditions of capitalism and the political structure are intricately woven into regular peoples’ daily lives. Furthering this concept, the American socialist Hal Draper points out:

"To engage in class struggle it is not necessary to ‘believe in' the class struggle any more than it is necessary to believe in Newton in order to fall from an airplane... The working class moves toward class struggle insofar as capitalism fails to satisfy its economic and social needs and aspirations, not insofar as it is told about struggle by Marxists. There is no evidence that workers like to struggle any more than anyone else; the evidence is that capitalism compels and accustoms them to do so."

Likewise, the notion that people are apathetic or careless is quite elitist. As seen in the recent presidential election, tens of millions of people become energized and mobilized in a fashion which has not been seen in decades and they successfully elected the first black president of a nation built on the terrible crime of slavery. It is apparent that when people feel they have some sense of power and control, imagined or real, they are more than willing to take their destiny into their own hands. As people win struggles (no matter how small) and gain confidence a sense of empowerment develops; Fred Hampton, Chicago chairman of the Black Panther Party, brutally murdered by the FBI in 1969, lucidly articulated this concept:

"[T]he masses belong to what you call the lower class, and when I talk about the masses, I'm talking about the white masses, I'm talking about the black masses, and the brown masses, and the yellow masses, too. We've got to face the fact that some people say you fight fire best with fire, but we say you put fire out best with water. We say you don't fight racism with racism. We're gonna fight racism with solidarity. We say you don't fight capitalism with no black capitalism; you fight capitalism with socialism…We ain't gonna fight no reactionary pigs who run up and down the street being reactionary; we're gonna organize and dedicate ourselves to revolutionary political power and teach ourselves the specific needs of resisting the power structure, arm ourselves, and we're gonna fight reactionary pigs with international proletarian revolution. That's what it has to be. The people have to have the power: it belongs to the people."

The need for interracial and “lower class” solidarity, active participation of the masses, centralized organization (to combat a very centralized power structure), and ultimately, revolution, are all clearly brought to the forefront in Hampton’s analysis.

The last claim, that the United States is now a “post-industrial” nation, articulated largely by post-modern, liberal intellectuals such as Daniel Bell, promotes the conception that due to the change of the class structure (from productive employment to the service section economy) in the United States any sort of workers’ revolution to challenge capitalism is not only irrelevant, but impossible. This ahistorical reading of the material conditions and the Marxist approach to struggle and the working class is flawed in many aspects. First, all workers are wage workers and are exposed to the same exploitation of their labor and the extraction of surplus value which, in turn, creates the capital for capitalism to function and profit to be realized; likewise, they workers still have their hands on the levers of power. Second, while the percentage of jobs in production have decreased relatively (to about 10% of the population, or thirty million workers), the productivity of workers has increased dramatically (up from $2.9 trillion in 1989 to $3.9 trillion in 2000 in manufacturing and up 155% in electronics during the same period) due to automation and labor saving technology. This means that the productive capacity of the United States now relies on a smaller group of workers or, simply, more power has been put into their (collective) hands. Thus, it takes a much smaller group of organized workers to collectively shut down production if some sort of general strike were to occur. Third, service sector workers make up the majority of the workforce; many of these jobs are highly exploitative, low wage positions (cashiers, retail salespersons, etc.) which post-Industrials misinterpret as a shift from industrialism or productive labor. This, however, stems from crucial misunderstanding of the service sectors critical tie to production. As Adam Turl notes, “the growth in services is not in opposition to industrial society but as a direct result of the needs of highly advanced—more productive—global lean production.” This means that service workers are able to exercise tremendous power over the system of production and distribution. To cite just one example, when the teachers in a city go on strike, the children who normally attend the schools in the area while their parents work must be cared for and many parents are forced to stay home which magnifies into broader economic implications. Every worker, directly industrial or in the service sector, fills an important niche which gives them a certain amount of power. Clearly, the implications of these facts cement the idea that the possibility of revolution (in the form of a general strike and workers’ seizing the means of production) to overthrow capitalism is still viable. More importantly, this revolution must come about by what Marx called the self-activity of the working class.

Huey P. Newton, leader of the Black Panther Party, in a debate with the arch-conservative intellectual William F. Buckley, asked him, had he been alive during the 1776 American Revolution “which side would you have been on?” Buckley answered that he “probably…would have been on the side of George Washington” but was not completely sure and, abstractly qualifying the answer in his normal fashion, claimed that he would have only participated if the revolution will go down in history as a “humane one.” Aside from the impossibility of Buckley’s qualification, he outlines how even the most wretched reactionary would have, at one point in time, supported revolution for what he saw as a just cause. His acceptance of revolution, therefore, is simultaneously an acceptance that revolution may act as the tool for those in pursuance of social transformation. It follows from this that given the tremendous inequality, the constantly expanding gap between rich and poor, the imperialist wars, and the host of other problems that identify American capitalism may be sufficient grounds for the demand of large scale change. As has been established, the only way to bring about such fundamental change is a revolution which smashes the current state and replaces it with democratic institutions that reach all realms of life, including the workplace; this process must come about by those who wield the power over production and distribution, the workers themselves. The question of revolution is the fundamental question that progressives and radicals must take up within the “post-industrial”, 21st century United States if they wish to see the immense changes needed to stop war, racism, poverty, environmental destruction and the other ills enervating humanity and the world.

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WORKS CITED

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- Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, (United States: Basic Books, 1976).
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On the Question of Revolution Part I

A century ago the famous Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, exiled from his homeland, despondent, and cooped up in a deplorable apartment building in Zurich, Switzerland, wrote “I will not see the revolution in my lifetime.” A month later, female workers in Russia conducted a massive strike against terrible working conditions which pored over to all working sectors and catalyzed the first phase of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Seventy years ago George Orwell described the excitement gripping Spain during the Civil War as he recorded his travels through Barcelona, the first town he had ever been to while “the working class was in the saddle” and where “every building of any size had been seized by the workers…every shop and café…had been collectivized … [and] revolutionary posters were everywhere, flaming from the walls…that made the few remaining advertisements look like daubs of mud.”Only four decades ago France sprung up in the one of its largest revolutionary upheavals since the French Revolution. Galvanized by student protesters pouring into the streets, the protest spread like wildfire to the working sector, culminating with more than ten million workers erecting barricades and clashing with police in what was the largest general strike of 1968. The United States has seen two enormous, bloody revolutions in the relatively short time span it has existed as a political entity; one to claim it’s independence in Britain and another which overthrow the institution of slavery in the South.

The radical American left has been everything but short of opinions and theories concerning revolution. Some fundamental questions arise for any individual, organization, or party seeking social transformation: Is revolution a requirement in order to fundamentally restructure society? How practical and effective is revolution as a means of progressive social change? What role does violence have in a revolution, should it be minimized and, if so, how? And, ultimately, is revolution even a feasible option in the United States (or, for that matter, in any first world, industrialized nation)? These are questions which the left has been forced to confront countless times in the midst of the various social uprisings and societal transitions throughout American history. These questions, and the challenge of providing pragmatic and veritable answers for them, are the fundamental issues which must be resolved for the advance of progressive social transformation. A material analysis of these questions, formulated by examining the overarching system of exploitation under capitalism, the primary functions of the state apparatus, and the plethora of historical examples leads to the resounding conclusion that not only is revolution possible within the confines of this “quintessential center-right nation,” but it is an absolute requirement to dismantle the oppressive institutions in existence and the social relations stemming from them in order to promote the liberation humanity as a whole.

The question of whether or not revolution is required to overthrow an exploitative system and replace it or whether radical groups should work through the system in place is a debate as old as revolutions themselves. Upon a deeper look, one will find that if the desire of a radical group is to fundamentally alter social relations and replace decrepit or malevolent societal institutions, than revolution is necessary. If, on the other hand, the organization’s scope remains narrow with small reforms or single issue demands as the main objectives within an otherwise sound system, it is a very different case. However, the most interesting argument, a sort of “middle of the road” postulation, is that working through the system (parliament, congress, the electoral process, etc.) voters are able to institute small reforms and, eventually, upon the compilation of all these small reforms society will have ultimately transformed itself through this process. This question is possibly one of the most highly debated and challenging conceptual roadblocks for many radical organizations, especially within the United States.

The answer to this question can be derived from studying the lessons of past revolutionary upheavals and attempts at progressive social change. Finding the explanation for why or why not they ended in failure or success is vital to understanding whether or not revolution is a requirement for more than superficial change. As the United States, and similarly radicals within the United States, are not isolated in a political and economic vacuum, reviewing historical occurrences from both within and outside of the United States will be necessary. To begin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his presidency in the midst of the great depression, was forced to push through a host of reforms which benefited the working class and the poor. Public works projects, the right to unionize, and many other serious gains were won during his presidency. On the surface, this would appear to be a benevolent gift from above and a signal that the system does indeed work. However, if the surface is scratched a bit further, one will find that FDR disregarded the idea that he was a friend of working class people, campaigning in 1936 as the “savior” of “the system of private profit and free enterprise,” claiming, in response to critics, that he was “the best friend the profit system ever had.” It took massive pressure from below in the form of protests, strikes, sit-ins, factory takeovers, and enormous class struggle against the system which forced him to make such concessions. In the past four decades, a vast majority of the wins made in the “New Deal” programs have been rolled back, wages have steadily declined for workers, rates of unionization have dropped dramatically, and speed-ups, overtime, and terrible benefits are common.

If nothing else is apparent, it is obvious that reforms alone cannot be the solution to societal transformation. Reforms can alter certain things within a society, yet leave the essential social and economic relationships intact. Thus, they are extremely susceptible to removal once the ruling class finds it beneficial to do so. As Paul D’Amato explains, “[t]he extension or retraction of a particular reform may ease or intensify the burden that capitalist exploitation and oppression puts on the mass of the population, but it does not change the fact of that exploitation.” The debate extends far outside the left of the United States; Rosa Luxemburg, in “Reform or Revolution,” states:

"[P]eople who pronounce themselves in favor of the method of legislative reform in place of and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society, they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society."

A wide range of historical examples can be analyzed to properly understand this philosophy, known widely as “reformism.” Almost universally this method of slowly transforming society into one which benefits the common majority has proved futile. One can look to the massive, social democratic reformist party in Germany in the early 20th century which held key positions in society and had won some gains for the working class as an example. By the 1930’s, however, Germany was not a social democratic haven but instead a fascist state dominated by Hitler and the Nazi party. Although an extreme example, Germany provides a paragon of reformist philosophy and explicates how, alone, reformism ultimately ends in defeat.

An even more urgent issue is what happens when a government comes to power through the established, electoral political system and embodies some sort of challenge to the ruling elites. Salvador Allende was democratically elected president of Chile in 1970 through a campaign promising massive change which would upset the institutions currently in place. His program, entitled “La vía chilena al socialismo,” (The Chilean Path to Socialism) focused on a few key reforms: the nationalization of the mining and banking industries, land redistribution to peasants from wealthy landlords, a government run healthcare and educational system, and food programs for the poor. Allende, while not a revolutionary and attempting to confine himself within the legal parameters of the established state, was a serious challenge to the wealthy elites and foreign corporations (such as the United States Anaconda mining corporation). In only three years the CIA orchestrated a coup with top Chilean military leaders in order to overthrow the democratically elected government, assassinate Allende, and replace him with the horrendous dictator Pinochet (who quickly introduced harsh neoliberal reforms, rolling back any gains won under Allende for workers and peasants). Ultimately, this tragic example highlights the limits of reformism.

From this, the logical assumption can be drawn that revolution is the key to ultimately transforming society. It can also be concluded that the state (the military, police, national guard, etc.) is not a neutral force and, thus, the ruling class will use the state apparatus to preserve their rule over the majority. Countless other examples could be cited which give credence to this fact. For instance, in the United States minor changes occur when the Democrats are elected to replace the Republicans (who, a few years later, simply switch positions again and the cycle repeats itself for eternity) but this has never provided any fundamental break with the ruthless profit system which both parties represent. Even if a seriously well intentioned, third party candidate was elected who planned to institute reforms which redistributed wealth from the elites to the working majority, an enormous legal, political, and economic battle would undoubtedly ensue which would prevent this from happening. The capitalist class has a wide array of legal mechanisms (loopholes, capital flight, etc.), state functions (monopoly of the legitimate use of force), and institutional biases (judges, other politicians, lawyers, etc. who are part of the ranks in question) that promote their interests at the expense of everyone else. A simple, hypothetical scenario within the U.S. framework provides an illuminating explanation of the limits of reform:

"Suppose that you were elected president and were determined to impose a tax on the rich to pay for a system of universal health care. Within minutes of taking office, you would get a visit from your appointed treasury secretary and the chair of the government’s central bank, the Federal Reserve, whom you didn’t pick. They would tell you that Wall Street wanted nothing to do with your plan unless you compromised. If you persisted, the bosses would take further action—perhaps sending their money out of the country so it couldn’t be taxed and causing turbulence on the financial markets until you cried 'uncle.' "

This is not to imply that reforms are unimportant or do not have a significant niche in developing the forces capable of changing society. On the contrary, reforms which improve the lives of working people should be embraced. More often than not these reforms bolster the confidence of the working class and poor; after all, it was that same class who organized and fought for them. For instance, winning the eight hour working day or the right to organize in the United States was a huge success for the labor movement; the right to vote for women was likewise a major step towards equality for the womens' suffrage movement. However, judging from past historical experience, the guiding objective of any radical movement which wishes to truly attain liberation must be revolution; nothing short of a revolution which overthrows the entire system and begins the recreation of a new society, promoting the well being of the majority rather than the rich, can maintain the gains of the past and defend itself against the reactionary forces intent on destroying those gains.

Now that the limits of reformism have been established, one may contend the effectiveness of revolution as means of social change. It should not be assumed that every political upheaval is one of progressive transformation; it is not the case that every revolution will succeed in achieving its goals or that they are infallible signs of progress. However, it can be said that revolution is a requirement for the fundamental restructuring of society to take place. To understand that massive, popular revolutions can secure the desires of the majority, however, it must first be demonstrated that regular people fighting back against the system can produce change. Again, historical examples from both the United States and around the world should be brought to light to truly understand this vital aspect need to achieve social and economic progress.

The civil rights movement in the United States during the 1960’s was a time of immense social struggle of grassroots efforts to combat the hideous forms of racism and prejudice which gripped both the South and the North, albeit in different forms. Enormous campaigns, waged by regular, working class people, both black and white, against the injustice and legal segregation of the South, along with the disguised institutional and economic inequality of the North, won some impressive reforms because of their struggle. Racial segregation was legally struck down, integration of the schools became common rhetoric, affirmative actions programs (despite largely targeting the already well to do) were implemented, blacks won back voting rights that were previously denied to them, and various other social gains were gained during this time.

However, if one were analyze the economic difference between blacks and whites forty years ago and blacks and whites today, one finds that not much difference has taken place. A slightly larger black “middle class” has developed, yet, enormous differences in wages, employment, education, housing, rates of incarceration, healthcare, and a host of other material factors highlight the massive inequality which continues to plague the nation.

The fact that a black man has just been elected to the highest office in the United States is something to be said in favor of the idea that personal prejudice has been combated quite thoroughly; however, the fact remains that institutional racism promotes vicious social and economic inequality. The reforms won during the 1960’s were important gains for the black community and society as a whole but they left the underlying class structure intact; the economic system of capitalism which produces this vast inequality was untouched and by incorporating some blacks into the ruling class, conservatives and the elites have been able to stifle legitimate complaints of inequality and intentional, structured racism. Some civil rights leaders did grasp the need for fundamental change, as Martin Luther King, Jr. pointed out:

"There are forty million poor people here. And one day we must ask the question, why are there forty million poor people in America? And when you begin to ask that question, you are raising questions about the economic system, about a broader distribution of wealth. When you ask that question, you begin to question the capitalistic economy… We are called upon to help the discouraged beggars in life's marketplace. But one day we must come to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring… [Y]ou begin to ask the question, 'who owns the oil?'... 'Who owns the iron ore?'… 'Why is it that people have to pay water bills in a world that is two-thirds water?' "

Two conclusions can be drawn from this example. First, it is apparent that when regular people stand up and organize campaigns to fight back against injustice they can win important gains for themselves. Second, it is true that without restructuring the basic economic system, those same social reforms won in the past can be easily reversed and stripped away when the ruling class finds it beneficial to do so.

Furthermore, by understanding the system as a hodgepodge of unrelated, isolated political issues further stimulates the idea that revolution is unneeded and, indeed, undesirable. On the contrary, one must adopt the idea that the various issues which impact people everyday are actually an interconnected web, relating to everything else in a very dialectical nature and brought together through the nexus of the dominant economic, political, and social system. To highlight one example, the United States is one of the few industrialized nations without free access to higher education. It also has the largest, strongest, and well equipped military in the world. At first, these two facts seem innocently separate from one another. It is not hard to conclude, however, that the military relies quite heavily on those who are victims of resource lacking, financially deprived educational institutions. The relatively poor primary education system and the tremendously expensive universities (also strongly correlated with crime, poverty, and hugely profitable prison industry) in the United States provide the military with a useful pool of candidates which they can prey upon. Likewise, every tax dollar which is applied to national defense, the military budget, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, missile defense programs in Eastern Europe, etc., is one less dollar which could be redirected for healthcare, job programs, crumbling public schools, public infrastructure, or a host of other things which would actually benefit the citizenry. Thus, it also becomes apparent that the cost of imperialism, for the benefit of a select few, is put on the backs of the many. Imperialism, of course, is a natural element of capitalism which must constantly attempt to dismantle trade barriers, forcefully open markets, control the world’s nature resources, and dominate the labor force of other nations. As president Woodrow Wilson so ravenously explained one hundred years ago:

"Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down…Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked or left unused."

Therefore, it is essential that radicals perceive the system as a whole and not as a single issue which exists in a political vacuum, an anomaly of an otherwise decent system.

To overcome such an immense, interconnected system, however, takes some sort of revolution. To find evidence that revolutions produce fundamentally different societies than those before them, one must only look to relatively recent examples of revolutionary events. The American Revolution of 1776 was the first time that a colony attempted to overthrow the rule of the mother country to gain independence and, even more importantly, abolish the monarchial system of governance (to be replaced with another exploitative, yet undeniably progressive, system where wealth controls the nation). The French Revolution in 1789, following suite, attempted to create an even more radical republican society where democratic institutions replaced the hereditary rule of kings (even beheading the monarch, quite symbolic). The Haitian Revolution, beginning in 1791, overthrew an entire slave system and created the first Black republic, which struck fear into the hearts of European empires and shook the very foundations of what the world had previously known. The Civil War in the United States from 1861-65, although not officially labeled a “revolution,” dismantled a slave society within a nation and instituted tremendous change for the course of American society where wage labor would go on to replace chattel slavery. The Russian Revolution of 1917 overthrew a tsar, dismantled a bourgeois parliament, and instituted, if only for a brief period prior to being destroyed and substituted with state capitalism, the first state run by workers councils (called soviets) which democratically controlled both the political and economic aspects of society.

The Civil War and Revolution in Spain, 1936, combated fascism as a political ideology and tens of thousands of regular, ordinary people attempted to institute a collective workers’ state; they succeeded shortly in some areas of Spain. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 was one of the first serious instances of a popular, nationalist revolution bravely

threatening U.S. hegemony and business interests in Latin America. Various revolutions in African won political independence (although rarely economic freedom) from traditionally oppressive European states. Many more examples exist and could be cited to explicate on the social progress which can be contained within a revolutionary uprising.

Thus, it is impossible to deny the utterly essential role of revolution in producing prodigious social change. The tenuous idea, stressed by the ruling elites, that large-scale change comes through a gradation of small reforms within the system is didactic; it is a form of propaganda to entrench citizens of a particular society within the confines of that society, delineating vacuous justifications for functioning inside of a certain realm in order to ameliorate the ills of society through small-scale, conservative goals. Upon closer analysis, the futility of this tactic (as the nexus of organization) becomes apparent and it’s true nature, that of enervating social movements, is unveiled. The next question, one which often divides even those who fight for overarching structural changes, is what role does violence play in a popular, mass revolutionary upheaval? Is there a natural proclivity towards violence that should be accepted as universal? Or should violence of all sorts be proscribed in a sort of utopian, Gandhian ideology?